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COVID-19: Cost-Benefit Analysis and Politics 
Abstract 
The COVID-19 pandemic forced governments around the world to make tough political decisions about 
the cost of saving lives and the limits of doing so. One of the striking aspects of the debates over these 
necessary tradeoffs is the relatively little weight individual rights seemed to have carried in these 
discussions. At first, this might have seen the triumph of cost-benefit analysis (CBA); and in a sense, it 
was. However, the pandemic has also shown the limitations of CBA, especially in the face of severe 
uncertainty. This essay reviews some of the sources of uncertainty in the context of the pandemic and 
shows how, in the face of such uncertainty, different countries fall back onto their political commitments, 
which include concern for individual rights. I thus argue that rather than being in competition to CBA, 
political considerations (including concern for individual rights) end up being incorporated into an 
impressionistic calculation of costs and benefits of government action. I conclude by suggesting that this 
is where future discussion of the theoretical foundations of CBA should focus on. 
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OF ALL THAT HAS CHANGED following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
the one that most immediately afected people’s lives is the stay-at-home orders 
that in diferent forms were put in place all over the world. While generally 
enjoying popular support, these policies also generated strong reactions from 
members of the public, politicians, policymakers, and scholars who worried 
that they were insufciently thought through and may end up causing more 
harm than good. Te worry boiled down to the view that the policies refected 
a panicked response that failed to consider the potential costs of the lockdown 
policies. Tis article addresses this question. It is not an attempt to consider every 
aspect of these policies; it focuses only on the question of “tradeofs”1 involved in 
them. As is clearer with every passing day, the isolation policies have saved many 
lives, but they also carry enormous costs, which will be felt for years to come. 
How, if at all, should these be weighed against each other? 
Tough the particular context in which this question is asked is as novel as 
the novel coronavirus, the question itself is not. It is arguably the most signifcant, 
most common, and probably also the most difcult, question that policy makers 
and lawyers face. For when we move from abstract legal principles to the real 
world of implementation and enforcement, where goals always outstrip budgets, 
the question is always “at the expense of what?” Other things being equal, a world 
with less crime, fewer accidents, cleaner environment, and healthier food than 
our own world is a better one. But other things are never equal. Achieving these 
goals does not come free; in fact, achieving improvements on some of the goals 
just mentioned may make it more difcult to improve on other goals we are also 
interested in (for example, greater equality and less poverty). 
Many lawyers are often loath to think in these terms. Law, they say, is about 
justice, not efciency; life is “priceless”; rights “are not for sale,” and so the very 
attempt to talking in terms of numbers is seen as a kind of professional, or even 
moral, betrayal.2 But increasingly lawyers too acknowledge that governmental 
policies must involve some accounting for their downsides. Cost-Beneft Analysis 
(CBA) is a term used for a range of ideas and techniques on how to conduct this 
balancing. At its simplest, CBA is the view that public regulation of risk of harm 
should be based on an assessment of the expected harms and weighed against 
1. See Emily Bazelon, “Restarting America Means People Will Die: So When Do We 
Do It?,” Te New York Times (10 April 2020), online: <nytimes.com/2020/04/10/ 
magazine/coronavirus-economy-debate.html>; cf R v Michaud, 2015 ONCA 585 at paras 
91-92 [Michaud]. 
2. For one book-length example of this attitude see Alain Supiot, Governance by Numbers: Te 
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the costs of eliminating those risks. Risk-reducing actions should continue up 
to the point that the marginal cost of reducing the risk exceeds the expected 
gain from action. 
Tis brief formulation may seem simple, and may strike some as obvious, 
but it remains controversial in theory and incredibly difcult to implement in 
practice. At the abstract level, some consider CBA an immoral approach that 
exhibits insufcient respect to human life and for everything else that is of real 
value.3 Even setting aside such worries, trying to implement CBA raises a host 
of questions on what precisely should be weighed, who should do the weighing, 
how to measure certain losses and benefts, what weight (if any) should be given 
to distributive considerations, and many others. 
Te COVID-19 outbreak provides an opportunity to examine some of the 
questions surrounding CBA with a case study of governmental policies that 
afected billions of people the world over. In the context of the lockdown policies, 
CBA asks that we evaluate whether the costs of these policies in terms of the 
social and economic dislocation they cause are worth the benefts in terms of 
lives saved and other possible benefts. Tis may seem obvious as it is generally 
uncontroversial that given a certain budget, one should aim for the biggest 
bang for the buck. Likewise, given a limited choice between several courses of 
action (or inaction), it makes sense to opt for the (in)action that will minimize 
the losses and maximize the benefts. To use an analogy to a now-famous 
thought experiment, one may think of the budget as the railway in the trolley 
problem: It sets absolute limits on the decision maker’s available options with a 
bad consequence occurring whichever option is taken. In such circumstances, 
most people think that one should choose the track that leads to fewer deaths.4 
Similarly, CBA urges us to choose the least bad option. 
But CBA is not quite analogical to the trolley problem, as it requires making 
judgments that many fnd counterintuitive and even outright immoral. For 
example, unlike the trolley problem that directly asks us to compare lives with 
lives, the costs and benefts involved with the lockdown policies are of diferent 
kinds. Tis requires creating some common currency to compare them. Tis in 
turn requires putting a price on life, and even less intuitively, implies that some 
3. See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, “Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Beneft Analysis of 
Environmental Protection” (2002) 150 U Pa L Rev 1553; Steven Kelman, “Cost-Beneft 
Analysis: An Ethical Critique,” Reg (January-February 1981) 33. 
4. See Marc D Hauser, Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right and 
Wrong (HarperCollins, 2006) at 127-28. 






   
 
540 
lives may not be worth saving. Standard CBA thus denies that saving lives, and 
preventing harm, enjoys some lexical priority over other societal goals.5 
Tese questions are signifcant for policymakers and lawyers, as many 
areas of law deal, directly or indirectly, with preventing harms. Increasingly, the 
law requires evaluating the costs involved in doing so in quite explicit terms. 
Regulatory policy guidelines published by the Canadian government’s call for 
“evidence-based” rule making based on “robust analysis of costs and benefts, 
and the assessment of risk.”6 On a few occasions, Canadian courts have similarly 
acknowledged the need for some kind of balancing of costs against benefts, 
in both public and private law.7 
Despite all this, CBA has received surprisingly little attention from Canadian 
legal academics.8 Tis short essay focuses on the diferent responses taken around 
5. For a critique of CBA on these grounds see Gregory C Keating, “Principles of Risk 
Imposition and the Priority of Avoiding Harm” (2018) 36 Revus 1; see also Cass R Sunstein, 
Te Cost–Beneft Revolution (MIT Press, 2018) at 27 (reporting on a survey showing that 
many disagree with CBA for related reasons). 
6. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, “Cabinet Directive on Regulation,” ss 3.0, 5.2.1, 
online: <canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/federal-regulatory-management/ 
guidelines-tools/cabinet-directive-regulation.html#toc3>; see also Treasury Board of Canada 
Secretariat, Canada Cost-Beneft Analysis Guide: Regulatory Proposals (President of the Treasury 
Board, 2007) online (pdf ): <tbs-sct.gc.ca/rtrap-parfa/analys/analys-eng.pdf>. 
7. See e.g. Michaud, supra note 1 at para 95 (“Te balancing of costs and benefts is in the 
very nature of regulatory design and its main challenge”). Te question of judicial review of 
regulation for failure to meet CBA requirement received relatively little judicial attention 
in Canada. For one short discussion see Quebec (AG) v Canada (National Energy Board), 
[1994] 1 SCR 159 at 178-81. In private law, the need to balance costs against benefts 
has also been recognized in determining the standard of care in negligence. See Ryan v 
Victoria (City), [1999] 1 SCR 201 at para 28; cf Daborn v Bath Tramways Motor Co Ltd,
[1946] 2 All ER 333 (CA) (“if all the trains in this country were restricted to a speed of fve 
miles an hour, there would be fewer accidents, but our national life would be intolerably 
slowed down” at 336). 
8. One rare exception, focused on environmental law, is Heather McLeod-Kilmurray & Gavin 
Smith, “Unsustainable Development in Canada: Environmental Assessment, Cost–Beneft 
Analysis, and Environmental Justice in the Tar Sands” (2010) 21 J Envtl L & Prac 65 at 
83-91. Te paucity of discussion is especially striking when compared with the interest in the 
topic by American legal academics. For an imprecise but instructive comparison, I searched 
Heinonline, the most comprehensive database of law journals, for articles with “cost-beneft 
analysis” in their title. Limiting the search to the United States yielded over 250 results. 
A similar search in Canadian publications yielded only two results (one from 1970, the other 
from 1986). (Te article cited in this note comes from a journal that is not in the database.) 
Both were brief and did not touch on the foundational issues surrounding CBA. Even 
accounting for the diference in population size (and correspondingly the size of the legal 
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the world to the COVID-19 outbreak. As such, it cannot address many of the 
questions pertaining to CBA that have been canvassed in the vast literature 
surrounding it. Nevertheless, I hope it will spur interest beyond its particular 
subject matter on the need for a more open discussion of CBA in the Canadian 
regulatory context. 
I begin this article by briefy considering some competitors to CBA that the 
pandemic has challenged. Of those, perhaps the most notable is how little weight 
individual rights seem to have had in discussions over the shutdown policies. 
Instead, discussion was dominated by attempts to evaluate the costs and benefts 
of diferent policies aimed at slowing the spread of the virus. While this may at 
frst look like a victory for CBA, Part II argues that the pandemic also highlighted 
some serious difculties with it, especially given the level of uncertainty against 
which decisions had to be made. Rather than CBA, diferent countries adopted 
one of several strategies, all acknowledging the need to balance costs against 
benefts but without any real attempt at a precise calculation. Part III describes 
three such strategies and argues that the choice of strategy was, partly at least, 
grounded in political ideas, including rights. Tose could be incorporated within 
CBA (broadly conceived), but they also show the limits of this method. Finally, 
in Part IV, I draw some tentative conclusions about the longer-term implications 
of the pandemic and responses to it for future regulatory decision making in 
welfare states. 
I. IDEAS THAT TOOK A HIT 
I mentioned at the outset that the debate over the lockdown policies has been 
couched in the language of tradeofs. Tat in itself is remarkable, because it means 
it was not couched in the language of rights. Te lockdown policies constituted 
a direct, savage blow to an activity that only a few months ago everyone would 
have considered to be among our most basic rights: to wander around freely 
in the streets. Perhaps even more signifcant have been the severe restrictions 
imposed on people’s use of their property, especially with respect to orders to 
shut down “non-essential” businesses. Tese policies, which were adopted with 
relatively little public protest, are a challenge to those who advance rights-based 









views of private law, where “the nub of a property right is that the owner rather 
than others gets to determine how the thing will be used.”9 
It is not that the language of rights has been completely absent—there were 
defnitely those who invoked it to object to various restrictions or requirements 
(like the wearing of protective masks)—but these voices were completely 
drowned out by the demand that we stay at home for the sake of the greater good, 
or, paternalistically, for individuals’ own good. Tose who invoked individual 
rights, which they claimed restricted government powers, were widely seen not 
as civil libertarian heroes but as selfsh cranks.10 If rights operate as “trumps” 
of individual choice over general welfare,11 then the pandemic has not been a 
good time for rights. 
It was not just right-wing notions of individual freedom that were hurt by the 
virus. Other non-consequentialist ideas voiced by more left-wing commentators 
were also aficted. One is the idea of incommensurability, the view that goods 
or values of diferent kinds cannot be compared with each other. As each life 
is priceless, the protection of life must be outside any economic calculation.12 
Another, related, idea is the lexical ordering of values, according to which the 
protection of life and the prevention of harm are prior to other lower-ranked 
values, and therefore cannot be traded of with them. In an essay entitled “Making 
Life Cheap,” one commentator called CBA “straightforwardly eliminationist,” 
and described it as follows: 
Since the value of a human life can be quantifed—at $9 million to $10 million, 
according to major federal agencies—death is acceptable, and lives expendable, when 
more valuable goods are involved. Te coronavirus pandemic has breathed new life 
9. Arthur Ripstein, “Possession and Use,” in James Penner & Henry E Smith, eds, Philosophical 
Foundations of Property Law (Oxford University Press, 2013) 156 at 160, 162 [emphasis in 
original]. Ripstein concedes (ibid at 160) that the right is subject to “public law limitations,” 
but what he refers to does not include the limits imposed during the pandemic. 
10. See e.g. Chris Herhalt, “Woman Roasted on Social Media after Refusing to Wear 
Mask in Toronto Hospital,” CTV News (6 July 2020), online: <toronto.ctvnews. 
ca/woman-roasted-on-social-media-after-refusing-to-wear-mask-in-toronto-
hospital-1.5012036>. 
11. See Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Harvard University Press, 1985) at 359. For an 
application of such ideas to pandemics see Janet E Mosher, “Accessing Justice amid Treats 
of Contagion” (2014) 51 Osgoode Hall LJ 919 (there need to be “clear and convincing 
evidence that [a] person whose rights are to be curtailed is infected with a contagious disease 
… and poses a demonstrable threat to others” at 932). 
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into this old utilitarian chestnut, and it is precisely the life-reducing mindset of cost-
beneft analysis that has driven the resistance to social distancing.13 
Te overheated language cannot hide the weakness of the argument. 
No society has ever treated life as priceless (although by most measures human 
life is better protected today than at any time in history).14 And it is actually 
CBA that encourages various forms of social distancing as a cost-efective way 
of saving lives.15 It is also wrong to suggest that the pandemic has revived a dead 
idea, as CBA has been in use for decades, as it matches everyday moral practices 
that show that humans do not treat life as priceless. All human societies around 
the world permit, and often encourage, the private ownership and operation of 
motor vehicles, even though this results in a staggering, and entirely foreseeable, 
cost to life and limb. While it is an interesting question whether the private 
ownership of cars would have survived CBA, it is actually individual rights 
discourse that makes car ownership a matter of “personal choice” that is beyond 
government regulation.16 
CBA of government risk regulation is a method that seeks to rationalize 
government action in order to achieve optimal risk reduction. CBA recognizes 
that all human activity—and what common-sense morality tends to forget, also 
human inactivity—carries with it the risk of injury and death. Even if societies 
decided to spend all their available funds on saving lives (something that no 
society has ever attempted), what specifc actions should be taken to save most 
lives would remain an open question. And since opportunity costs are costs, even 
in such a scenario CBA would be inescapable. Terefore, properly understood, 
subjecting lockdown policies to CBA is not “a choice between lives and dollars.”17 
Te dollars are used by people, and when they do not have them—when “the 
economy” falters—people are hurt. Te contrast is based on a natural but fallacious 
tendency to weigh immediate outcomes that are the result of a direct causal path 
and ignore other outcomes whose causal paths are less obvious but no less real. 
13. Aaron Timms, “Making Life Cheap,” Te New Republic (June 2020) 38 at 38, 40. Te fgures 
mentioned refer to value of a “statistical life,” which is currently measured at about nine 
million USD. For a discussion see text accompanying note 39 below. 
14. See generally Steven Pinker, Te Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined 
(Penguin, 2011) at chs 1-4. 
15. See e.g. Chris Barrett et al, “Economic and Social Impact of Infuenza Mitigation Strategies 
by Demographic Class” (2011) 3 Epidemics 19. 
16. Cf Sarah A Seo, “Te New Public” (2016) 125 Yale LJ 1616 at 1649-55 (recounting the 
characterization of driving as freedom from government intervention). 
17. Timms, supra note 13 at 40. 
(2020) 57 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
 
 







II. THE TRIUMPH OF CBA? 
A. CBA WITH MASSIVE UNCERTAINTY 
Can we conclude from the preceding discussion, however truncated and brief, 
that the pandemic has fnally shown that CBA is, as one commentator put it 
a few years ago, the “only game in town”?18 Alas, it turns out that matters are 
not quite so simple. While the idea behind CBA is sound, in practice CBA is 
valuable only if it rests on good data. Otherwise, it is potentially worse than 
useless, as it can create the impression of a precise numerical (and as such, 
apolitical) guide to action which available knowledge does not in fact warrant. 
Even if the pandemic has been a victory of sorts for consequentialism, it has also 
provided an instructive case study of the problems with CBA in circumstances 
of great uncertainty. 
Of course, this problem has been recognized before in other contexts, but 
defenders of CBA have tended to minimize its scope. For example, Cass Sunstein, 
who is an eager advocate of CBA, has written that cases where agencies “may be 
operating under circumstances of ignorance, in which they cannot specify either 
outcomes or probabilities” are “rare.”19 If by this Sunstein meant cases where 
regulators are required to make a decision based on no information at all, then 
the phenomenon is indeed rare. But cases of signifcant uncertainty are quite 
common. For example, in debates in the United States over the death penalty, 
some have argued that empirical evidence shows it provides a powerful deterrent, 
and as such it “saves” many lives. Others, however, have shown how sensitive 
these fndings are to small changes in the models.20 It takes only a slight change 
to them to fnd that the death penalty increases the prevalence of murder.21 
18. Barbara H Fried, “Te Limits of a Nonconsequentialist Approach to Torts” (2012) 18 Legal 
Teory 231 at 231. 
19. Cass R Sunstein, “Te Limits of Quantifcation” (2014) 102 Calif L Rev 1369 at 1380, 
1386. But cf Cass R Sunstein, Worst-Case Scenarios (Harvard University Press, 2007) at 163 
(“at least a degree of uncertainty, in which probabilities cannot be assigned with specifed 
bands, is not so rare”). 
20. See John J Donohue & Justin Wolfers, “Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death 
Penalty Debate” (2005) 58 Stan L Rev 791 [Donohue & Wolfers, “Uses”]; John J Donohue, 
III & Justin Wolfers, “Estimating the Impact of the Death Penalty on Murder” (2009) 11 
Am L & Econ Rev 249. 
21. See Donohue & Wolfers, “Uses,” supra note 20 at 825-26. Incidentally, one of the targets of 
this article was Sunstein, who relying on earlier empirical studies, has argued in support of 
the death penalty. See ibid at 825. Another study, more pertinent for present purposes, has 
delved into the costs and benefts of a single environmental regulation, again showing some 
of the uncertainties involved, is Tomas O McGarity, “Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy Math” 









PRIEL, COVID-19: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND POLITICS 545 
Te difculties with evaluating the costs and benefts of lockdown policies 
in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak far outweigh the difculties with 
assessing the deterrent efect of the death penalty. In the death penalty studies, 
the relevant data are available and the biggest difculty is isolating the impact 
of the death penalty from other societal changes that infuence the prevalence 
of murder. Tis is difcult enough, but it is nothing compared to the levels of 
uncertainty decision makers are facing in the present pandemic. 
Starting with the benefts of the lockdown policies, the most obvious one is 
saved lives. To know just how many lives have been saved by shutdown policies, 
one needs to know how many would have died without them. Tis is difcult, 
as there are signifcant diferences in estimates of the infection rate and the 
infection fatality rate of the SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19. 
For reasons that are as yet not entirely clear, these rates have been dramatically 
diferent for diferent countries, and often also for diferent regions within one 
country, or within one country at diferent times. Even something as seemingly 
simple as the number of people who died from the virus—supposedly a matter 
of mere counting—is not quite certain, even though such a number is crucial for 
being able to evaluate the infectiousness of the virus. Calculations based on excess 
mortality suggest COVID-19 may be more lethal than ofcial mortality counts 
say; but excess mortality calculations themselves may be inaccurate, as they may 
refect deaths of people deciding to forgo treatment for other conditions.22 If such 
a choice is the result of the lockdown policies, these deaths may be attributed 
not to the virus but to the governmental response to it. On all these matters, 
our knowledge constantly improves, but it must be remembered that signifcant 
uncertainty remains and that initial decisions on lockdown had to be made 
against far higher levels of uncertainty. 
Some attempts to calculate the costs and benefts of the lockdown included 
only saved lives as a beneft. But though the most signifcant beneft, it is not 
the only one. Another signifcant beneft of non-infection due to isolation is 
the saving from avoided infections for those who recover. Tis, of course, was 
always a beneft, but it assumes greater relevance as time goes by since mortality 
rates for those infected seem to have gone down quite dramatically across all age 
groups.23 Whatever the reasons, this means that the benefts of lockdown are 
22. See Denis Grady, “Te Pandemic’s Hidden Victims: Sick or Dying, but Not from the 
Virus,” Te New York Times (14 May 2020), online: <nytimes.com/2020/04/20/health/ 
treatment-delays-coronavirus.html>. 
23. See Heidi Ledford, “Why Do COVID Death Rates Seem to Be Falling?,” (2020) 
587 Nature 190. 







lower, but it must be remembered that one of the reasons for this improvement 
is that those infected today often get to less overwhelmed hospitals, because 
of the institution of lockdown policies. Another reason is that those infected 
today have the beneft of better treatment protocols than those infected in the 
early months of the pandemic. Avoiding these often-costly treatments is still a 
signifcant beneft from non-infection, i.e. from lockdown. Avoided infections 
also prevent the potential economic efects of an infected person’s inability to 
work, which may extend to others, even if not themselves infected but who need 
to isolate. (To be sure, the lockdown itself may limit one’s ability to work, but 
workplace adjustments have at least partially addressed this; someone ill may not 
be able to work, and had there been no lockdown fewer of these alternatives may 
have been developed.) 
Further benefts from non-infection for those who without lockdown would 
have become ill and recovered are even more difcult to assess at this point. Chief 
among them are the long-term health efects of the virus: What was initially 
thought to be a virulent respiratory disease is now coming to be seen as an illness 
that aficts some patients’ hearts, kidneys, and even their brains.24 How frequent 
these efects are among those who recover, how serious they are, and especially 
how long they last are all at this stage largely unknown and may not be fully 
known for years. In addition to the savings from avoided infections, on the side 
of the benefts one has to include the signifcant improvement in air quality 
in many cities, as well as the decline in trafc and other accidents (following a 
decline in economic activity).25 Tough many of these changes are temporary, 
some of this beneft may prove long lasting: Lockdown policy have had a 
disruptive efects on many workplace practices, which some predict will outlast 
24. See Ariana Eunjung Cha, “Coronavirus Autopsies: A Story of 38 Brains, 87 Lungs and 42 
Hearts,” Te Washington Post (1 July 2020), online: <washingtonpost.com/health/2020/
07/01/coronavirus-autopsies-fndings>; Pam Belluck, “Here’s What Recovery from Covid-19 
Looks Like for Many Survivors,” Te New York Times (1 July 2020), online: <nytimes. 
com/2020/07/01/health/coronavirus-recovery-survivors.html>; Ed Yong, “Long-Haulers 
Are Redefning covid-19,” Te Atlantic (19 August 2020), online: <theatlantic.com/health/ 
archive/2020/08/long-haulers-covid-19-recognition-support-groups-symptoms/615382/>. 
25. See Farhad Manjoo, “I have Seen the Future Without Cars, and It’s Amazing,” Te 
New York Times (9 July 2020), online: <nytimes.com/2020/07/09/opinion/sunday/ 
ban-cars-manhattan-cities.html>; Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Deaths of Despair and the 
Future of Capitalism (Princeton University Press, 2020) at 26, 141-42 (mortality rates go 
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the pandemic.26 If fewer people commute daily to work, if there is less business 
travel, one consequence of the pandemic may be long-term improvement in 
the environment. 
On the side of costs, the most evident and immediate efect of the lockdown 
has been a massive economic slowdown. Unemployment in Canada jumped 
from 5.6 per cent prior to the pandemic to 13.7 per cent in May 2020 with entire 
industries (hospitality, entertainment, brick-and-mortar retail, among others) 
coming to an almost complete stop in activity. Tough the government has been 
providing support for small businesses, it did not fully ofset the losses, and data 
begin to suggest rise in bankruptcies, with the worst yet to come.27 Longer term 
efects of the lockdown policies are less clear, but past experience suggests that 
major economic shocks have long-term efects on the employment and earning 
prospects of those who are entering the labour market during (or in the aftermath 
of ) the shock.28 In addition, there have already been reports of higher incidence of 
domestic abuse, mental health problems, and suicide as a result of the economic 
dislocation, isolation, and confnement following the shutdown policies.29 (To 
add to the complexity, to accurately measure the efect of government isolation 
policies, one has to exclude from the calculation behavioural changes that would 
have happened spontaneously.) 
Another likely cost from the current crisis involves the signifcant debts 
governments incur to deal with increased expenditures and reduced revenue. 
In all likelihood these debts will be paid of, at least in part, from future budget 
26. See Clive Tompson, “What If Work from Home Goes On…Forever?,” Te New 
York Times (9 June 2020), online: <nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/09/magazine/ 
remote-work-covid.html>. 
27. See Pete Evans, “As Covid-19 Relief Programs Wind Down, Bankruptcies Are 
Starting to Spike Again,” CBC (15 November 2020), online: <cbc.ca/news/business/ 
insolvency-bankruptcy-covid-1.5798319>; see also Pat Foran, “More than Half of Canadian 
Restaurants May Close Permanently Within Months, Survey Finds,” CTV News (28 August 
2020), online: <toronto.ctvnews.ca/more-than-half-of-canadian-restaurants-may-close-
permanently-within-months-survey-fnds-1.5083961>. 
28. See Eduardo Porter & David Yafe-Bellany, “Facing Adulthood with an Economic Disaster’s 
Lasting Scars,” Te New York Times (19 May 2020), online: <nytimes.com/2020/05/19/ 
business/economy/coronavirus-young-old.html>. 
29. See Jennifer Koshan, Janet Mosher & Wanda Wiegers, “COVID-19, the Shadow Pandemic, 
and Access to Justice for Survivors of Domestic Violence” (2020) 57 Osgoode Hall LJ 739; 
see also Sebastian Payne, “Coronavirus: Te Hidden Health Costs of the UK Lockdown,” 
Te Financial Times (26 April 2020), online: <ft.com/content/0ccaac50-854c-11ea-
b555-37a289098206>; Cec Haire, “Increase in Domestic Violence Calls Persists Troughout 
the Pandemic, Says Non-Proft,” CBC News (2 July 2020), online: <cbc.ca/news/canada/ 
newfoundland-labrador/violence-prevention-east-val-barter-domestic-covid-1.5632993>. 











cuts to various governmental programs. If history is our guide, it is safe to assume 
that such cuts will disproportionately hurt low-income individuals. To the extent 
that distributive considerations are relevant for CBA—and there are good reasons 
to think that they do—this is another likely cost of current policies, but whose 
magnitude it is very difcult at this stage to estimate. 
With the efects of the shutdown discussed so far, one could place them on 
the side of costs or benefts with relative confdence. For other possible efects 
of the current pandemic, beyond estimating what will happen, it is difcult to 
know their overall valence. For instance, the lockdown policies forced many 
workplaces to switch quickly to remote work. Tis generated many immediate 
costs, but those may spur long-needed, benefcial changes to work practices.30 
Several employers have indicated that they now plan to expand work-from-home 
practices, citing savings related to the acquisition and maintenance of expensive 
real estate and, more surprisingly, increased productivity. If such changes prove 
lasting, would the positives (e.g., more leisure time and less anxiety from avoided 
commutes to work, less pollution from reduced trafc) outweigh the negatives 
(e.g., less sociability)? 
In assessing the costs and benefts of the pandemic, one signifcant unknown 
is the time it will take before life returns to something resembling its pre-pandemic 
form. Tis partly depends on how long it will take to develop a vaccine or an 
efective treatment for the virus. While the distribution of vaccines has begun, 
it will be months before they are widely available. Worryingly, there are also 
discouraging indications that a vaccine may provide only temporary or limited 
protection. In these circumstances, even small changes can have signifcant efects 
on our ability to return to engaging in the same social interactions known from 
before the pandemic. By then, some changes initially thought to be temporary 
may become permanent. 
Even more signifcant changes may come about as a result of the pandemic, 
but these are even more difcult to predict and assess. Historians have argued 
that some pandemics have brought with them epoch-making change: Te 
bubonic plague that killed between one-third to one-half of Europe’s population 
in the middle of the fourteenth century is cited as an important factor in bringing 
about the end of feudalism, the beginning of the Renaissance and the emergence 
of capitalism; the 1918 pandemic is sometimes mentioned as bolstering the 
case for expanding the franchise to women. Closer to lawyers’ concern, the very 
30. For the suggestion that the court system may take advantage of pandemic to efect signifcant 
reform see Suzanne E Chiodo, “Ontario Civil Justice Reform in the Wake of COVID-19: 
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justifcation for government regulation of public health that many now take for 
granted may have been born in reaction to the Black Death. In a book dedicated 
to the social efects of pandemics, Frank Snowden wrote that “[p]lague regulations 
… cast a long shadow over political history. Tey marked a vast extension of 
state power into spheres of human life that had never before been subject to 
political authority. … Te campaign against plague … promoted an accretion of 
the power and legitimation of the modern state.”31 
It is possible that the current pandemic will have a similar impact. Before 
the pandemic, there were serious concerns over the vast amounts of personal data 
now held by tech companies and governments. In many countries the pandemic 
has led to the adoption of privacy-intruding policies, now possible with the use of 
digital technologies. Will people be willing to cast aside their worries over privacy 
for the sake of public health and a return to “normal life”? A news report on 
China noted that its government has “long sought to harness vast troves of digital 
information to their sprawling, sometimes unruly nation more efciently.”32 
Following the adage that one should not let a crisis go to waste, will China and 
other countries take advantage of this pandemic to expand the reach of such 
policies? If such changes do happen, should they be included in a CBA of the 
efects of government policies? And if so, how?33 
B. MODELS AND THEIR LIMITS 
Scientists face uncertainty all the time. Tis does not mean that they cannot make 
successful predictions. Teir main tool for dealing with uncertainty is models. 
Models are tools for better understanding reality by way of creating a simplifed 
representations of it.34 At times, the point of the simplifcation is to highlight 
certain aspects of reality, at others it is to make explanations and predictions more 
tractable, at still others it is to deal with gaps in available data. Terefore, that a 
31. Frank M Snowden, Epidemics and Society: From the Black Death to the Present (Yale University 
Press, 2019) at 81-82; see also Mitchell L Hammond, Epidemics and the Modern World
(University of Toronto Press, 2020) at 38-39. 
32. See Raymond Zhong, “China’s Virus Apps May Outlast the Outbreak, Stirring Privacy 
Fears,” Te New York Times (26 May 2020), online: <nytimes.com/2020/05/26/technology/ 
china-coronavirus-surveillance.html>. 
33. One could be even more speculative: Before the outbreak, many forecasters predicted 
President Donald Trump would win re-election because the US economy was doing well. 
Trump’s disastrous response to the pandemic and its efect on the American economy are 
now seen as one of the factors that have led to his loss. Should one count this as a beneft 
of the pandemic? 
34. Tis in itself is a simplifcation, as models sometimes serve other functions. For a discussion 
see Tarja Knuuttila, “Models, Representation, and Mediation” (2004) 72 Phil Sci 1260. 












model leaves out certain aspects of reality—i.e., that strictly speaking, it is false— 
is not necessarily a problem with it. 
By the same token, it is not enough to say that simply because scientists use 
models, uncertainty is not an issue. Not all models, and not all uncertainties, 
are created equal.35 In the present context, early models have reached widely 
divergent conclusions on the wisdom of various policies.36 For example, a group 
of economists concluded that lockdown policies were justifed by comparing 
the value of saved lives with the economic costs of such policies and concluded 
that the former outweighs the latter: Te estimated savings from the lockdown 
policies were valued at 12.4 trillion USD, which was deemed much greater than 
the estimated GDP losses to the United States economy, estimated at 7.21 trillion 
USD.37 As the model only calculated the benefts from saved lives against the 
cost as measured by decline in GDP, it excluded many of the costs and benefts 
mentioned above. By contrast, an epidemiologist, questioned lockdown policies 
by arguing that they were rushed and possibly infated the harm caused by the 
illness (i.e., the benefts from government policies).38 
Some of the diferences related to questions of model design (e.g., what costs 
and benefts are included in the calculation) and empirical questions (e.g., how 
many people will die in the absence of lockdown policies), which are matters 
on which we can expect models to improve as better data are available, some of 
35. Cf Daniel A Farber, “Modeling Climate Change and Its Impacts: Law, Policy, and Science” 
(2008) 86 Tex L Rev 1655 (explaining why climate models predicting global warming are 
superior to economic models of the economic impact of climate change). 
36. See Martin Enserink & Kai Kupferschmidt, “Mathematics of Life and Death: How 
Disease Models Shape National Shutdowns and Other Pandemic Policies,” Science 
(25 March 2020), online: <sciencemag.org/news/2020/03/mathematics-life-and-death-
how-disease-models-shape-national-shutdowns-and-other>; Fareed Zakaria, “Why 
the Coronavirus Models Aren’t Totally Accurate,” Te Washington Post (9 April 2020), 
online: <washingtonpost.com/opinions/without-mass-testing-were-fying-blind-through-
this-crisis/2020/04/09/bf61e178-7a9b-11ea-a130-df573469f094_story.html>; Joel 
Achenbach, “‘Tell Me What to Do! Please!’: Even Experts Struggle with Coronavirus 
Unknowns,” Te Washington Post (26 May 2020), online: <washingtonpost.com/health/ 
tell-me-what-to-do-please-even-experts-struggle-with-coronavirus-unknowns/2020/05/25/ 
e11f9870-9d08-11ea-ad09-8da7ec214672_story.html>. 
37. See Linda Tunström et al, “Te Benefts and Costs of Using Social Distancing to Flatten 
the Curve for COVID-19” (2020) 11 J Beneft-Cost Analysis 179. Te calculation for 
the beneft was an estimate of 1.24 million lives saved times 10 million USD per saved 
statistical life. 
38. John PA Ioannidis, “A Fiasco in the Making? As the Coronavirus Pandemic Takes Hold, 
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the diferences are due to normative judgments. Here is one: what is the beneft 
accrued from a saved life? Setting aside ethical qualms about any attempt to 
answer such a question in terms of dollars and cents, one fnds in the relevant 
literature two diferent approaches that in the context of the COVID-19 
pandemic may lead to very diferent conclusions. One approach uses the measure 
of “value of statistical life” (VSL) to measure the value of each life saved. Tough 
there is no uniform measure for VSL, it is currently typically measured at about 
nine to ten million US dollars. Te other approach, known as “Quality Adjusted 
Life Years” (QALY), measures how many years a regulatory intervention will add, 
and further weighs “healthy” years more than others.39 Te latter approach thus 
treats the benefts from saving the life of an older person as lower than that of a 
young person, as the former has fewer years left to live, and those are typically of 
“lower” quality. 
People of all age groups have died of COVID-19, but the distribution of 
fatalities has been very heavily skewed toward older people: In Canada, 96 per 
cent of those who died of COVID-19 were sixty years old or older.40 In addition, 
those who died tended to be people with several comorbidities, i.e. people 
who even before the outbreak were less healthy.41 One reason for the diferent 
conclusions of the two studies mentioned above is that the former used the VSL 
approach, whereas the latter took the age and health of most decedents into 
39. Tese are not the only ones. For a discussion of these approaches and a proposal of yet 
another one see Sean Hannon Williams, “Statistical Children” (2013) 30 Yale J on Reg 63 
(arguing for VSL with an added “child premium”). Te text ignores many complications 
related to these two competing approaches. On some of them see Sunstein, supra
note 5 at ch 3. 
40. See Sharon Kirbey, “In Canada, the Cases of COVID-19 and Deaths are Declining. Here’s 
the Story Behind the Numbers,” National Post (11 July 2020), online: <nationalpost. 
com/news/in-canada-the-cases-of-covid-19-and-deaths-are-declining-heres-the-story-
behind-the-numbers>. 
41. Eighty-one per cent of deaths from COVID-19 in Canada were of long-term care residents. 
See Canadian Institute of Health Information, Pandemic Experience in the Long-Term Care 
Sector: How Does Canada Compare with Other Countries? (June 2020) at 2, online (pdf ): 
CIHI Snapshot <www.cihi.ca/sites/default/fles/document/covid-19-rapid-response-long-
term-care-snapshot-en.pdf>. According to a 2015 report, the average length of stay at a 
long-term care facility in Ontario was 2.7 years (the median was 1.6 years). See Health 
Analytics Branch, Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Long-Term Care in Ontario: 
Sector Review (September 2015) at 17, online (pdf ): <longtermcareinquiry.ca/wp-content/ 
uploads/Exhibit-169-Long-Term-Care-in-Ontario-Sector-overview.pdf>. While these fgures 
do not account for the reason for the end of the stay, the two most common reasons for 
discharge are a move to a hospital (46.9 percent) and death (30.6 per cent). See ibid at 16. 











account.42 Nothing in the CBA method itself answers the question which of 
these approaches should be adopted, and our practices do not reveal a perfectly 
consistent pattern. In some contexts, societies adopt something closer to the QALY 
approach: When it comes to allocating organs for transplantation to potential 
recipients, decision protocols give priority to younger and otherwise healthier 
patients. At other times, we reject such calculations and refuse comparisons that 
suggest some lives are worth more than others. 
Tis point reveals a fundamental question about CBA that I have so far 
ignored, namely that despite its proponents’ occasional claims to being engaged in 
a purely “technocratic” calculation, it contains unavoidable normative questions. 
Just how signifcant this component is, how devastating it is for CBA, is itself a 
(politically) contested question. I do not know of anyone who denies that some of 
the questions at the heart of CBA are not purely a matter of empirical calculation. 
To critics of CBA, this undermines the entire aspiration of employing CBA as a 
more rigorous (albeit potentially mistaken) method for assessing risk regulation. 
Tey contend that CBA is just better at hiding its normative choices under a 
veneer of false objectivity that comes with quantifcation.43 When this veneer is 
scratched of, it becomes evident that many quantifcations that go into actual 
CBA rest on dubious foundations that lack scientifc basis.44 
Proponents of CBA acknowledge this and ofer two responses. One is that 
there is still a meaningful distinction between scientifc and normative questions; 
and they further argue that scientists should be in charge of the former. Tey 
point out that a major reason why risk regulation is so wasteful and irrational is 
42. Tis in itself may refect a disciplinary diference. VSL is common among economists, QALY 
among health care professionals. See Williams, supra note 39 at 120. Tunström et al, supra
note 37, is the work of economists; Ioannides, supra note 38, was written by a medical doctor 
and epidemiologist. 
43. See Wendy E Wagner, “Te Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation” (1995) 95 Colum L 
Rev 1613 at 1632-35, 1701-702; see also Cory Coglianese & Gary E Merchant, “Shifting 
Sands: Te Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards” (2004) 152 U Pa L Rev 1255 at 
1265, 1274, 1324. 
44. For demonstrations of the non-scientifc, and often politically-motivated, assumptions that 
have gone into specifc exercises in evaluating the costs and benefts of particular regulations 
see McGarity, supra note 21 at 2356-65; Mark Kelman, “On Democracy-Bashing: 
A Skeptical Look at the Teoretical and ‘Empirical’ Practice of the Public Choice Movement” 
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because it is often driven by unfounded popular fears.45 For example, no matter 
how we measure the value of life, it is a matter of fact that terrorism poses a far 
smaller risk of death than heart attacks, and that budgetary outlays should refect 
this fact, even if most people fear the former more. 
For some, however, this view amounts to undermining democracy: What 
risks should be regulated and to what degree are political questions “all the way 
down.” If people care or fear some risks more than others, their choices should be 
respected. Tose who advance these views note that public attitudes about these 
matters are typically correlated with standard political worldviews or ideologies: 
for example, people with more egalitarians views tend to be more worried about 
global warming; people with more hierarchical views tend to be more concerned 
about drugs and want them to be more heavily regulated.46 To make risk experts 
decide how much to spend on diferent risks is to remove from democratic debate 
questions that have always been considered the core of public discourse. Indeed, 
for some of these defenders of regulatory democracy, the presentation of popular 
opinions on risk as “errors” is itself mistaken. People’s attitudes to risk refect 
certain identifable patterns. For instance, the risk of a single event (a “disaster”) 
leading to thousand deaths is considered worse than a similar risk leading to a 
similar number of deaths, when those are scattered over time; deaths perceived 
as involuntary or in circumstances of lack of control are perceived as worse than 
deaths in more “voluntary” circumstances; and “dread factor” makes some kinds 
of death (e.g., from a nuclear accident) be considered worse than others. For 
some, this does not show that people are irrational, but that, as psychologist Paul 
Slovic put it, people’s “conceptualization of risk is much richer than that of the 
experts and refects legitimate concerns that are typically omitted from expert 
risk assessments.”47 
Tis approach has led some to challenge the expert-led approach to risk 
regulation as fundamentally anti-democratic. But the argument is overdrawn. 
Tere are truths about risks, and usually experts know those better than most 
people. In making policy decisions on COVID-19, epidemiologists’ views on 
45. See e.g. Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Efective Risk Regulation (Harvard 
University Press, 1993) at 59-63; Cass R Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary 
Principle (Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 126-28. Tis view also assumes, 
controversially, that experts are better than lay people at insulating themselves from cognitive 
biases. I cannot deal with this question here. 
46. See e.g. Dan M Kahan et al, “Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk” 
(2006) 119 Harv L Rev 1071 at 1083-87. 
47. Paul Slovic, “Perception of Risk” (1987) 236 Sci 280 at 285. For drawing out the regulatory 
implications of this view see Kahan et al, supra note 46. 








the risks involved should count more than the views of peddlers of conspiracy 
theories.48 Tis is in fact a familiar feature of modern democracy. What 
percentage of the defence budget should be allocated for jet fghters as opposed 
to submarines, tanks, or cyberwarfare, is not a question decided by “the people,” 
nor is it typically decided by their representatives; it is a question decided by 
experts. Te same is true of most public health decisions, such as whether to 
purchase another fMRI machine or to hire more doctors (at the hospital level), 
or how much to allocate to education for healthier eating over cancer research (at 
the health-care system level). Te reason is simple: Most people know nothing, 
or less than nothing, about these matters. Te amount of misinformation about 
COVID-19 has been signifcant, with numerous unfounded claims about its 
origins, its risks, or of reliable methods for dealing with it. For all its uncertainty, 
scientifc expertise on matters of public health is not just “one perspective” that 
is no better than any other, and there is already quite clear evidence that those 
places that followed well-established public health procedures have done better 
than those that have not.49 
It is true, however, that the scope of decisions allocated to experts is itself a 
politically contested question, and one on which diferent countries take diferent 
approaches, refecting diferent ways of subjecting CBA to democracy. Against 
this, a second response to the democratic defcit of CBA works by expanding 
what is included in the technocratic calculation of costs and benefts, thereby 
turning at least some normative questions into empirical ones. In a way, this 
approach tries to calculate democracy into the CBA. Te democratic approach 
to risk regulation considered earlier, treats regulatory decisions based on fear as 
valid even if the fear is not grounded in facts, as long as the fear refects people’s 
genuine choices. By contrast, the technocratic response contends that an accurate 
calculation of costs and benefts must include the welfare costs that come from 
fear.50 A regulatory decision that will mitigate fear will generate benefts even 
48. Tose are more common than one would like to think. See Dominik Stecula, Mark Pickup 
& Clifton van der Linden, “A Survey of Canadians Shows a Worrying Number of Believers 
More Likely to Ignore Recommended Health Behaviours. Te Consequences Could Be 
Devastating,” Policy Options (6 July 2020), online: <policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/ 
july-2020/who-believes-in-covid-19-conspiracies-and-why-it-matters> (reporting on a 
poll that found that as many as 25 per cent of Canadians have some belief in at least one 
conspiracy theory about covid-19). 
49. See e.g. Charles Duhigg, “Seattle’s Leaders Let Scientists Take the Lead. New York’s Did 
Not,” Te New Yorker (26 April 2020), online: <newyorker.com/magazine/2020/05/04/ 
seattles-leaders-let-scientists-take-the-lead-new-yorks-did-not>. 
50. See Matthew D Adler, “Fear Assessment: Cost-Beneft Analysis and the Pricing of Fear and 
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if the fear itself has no basis in reality. If accepted, it is difcult to limit this 
idea to one emotion. One’s disappointment from the lack of protection for 
what one values is a cost that should be included: Te opponent of abortion 
sufers a welfare loss from knowing that abortions are being legally performed; 
and the opponent of animal farming sufers a loss from knowing it is allowed, 
even if she is a vegetarian. Sunstein, who in the past favoured allocating risk 
regulation decisions to experts because they are better informed than the people, 
has more recently also argued that upset over such disappointed beliefs should be 
included in CBA.51 
While the attempt to minimize the scope of politics in CBA may be 
admirable, this proposal is problematic. If this is to be done, many of the popular 
errors to be excluded from CBA will be brought back in into the calculation, only 
in diferent guise: People’s erroneous views should not determine which risks to 
regulate; that remains a matter for experts. But experts will now be required to 
also include the costs accruing from people’s disappointments of their errors not 
becoming law. In other words, whereas the “democratic” approach extends the 
domain of politics when it comes to who should make the decision, the expert-led 
“technocratic” approach may end up looking quite similar if it includes political 
preferences in determining what the costs and benefts are.52 It is odd to propose 
CBA as a means of avoiding errors in regulatory decisions, only to bring those 
errors back into the fold in a diferent way. 
Furthermore, rather than improving CBA, such suggestions will make CBA 
calculations even more difcult to calculate, and consequently make the CBA 
process much more prone to political manipulation, a technique that could 
be used to justify any desired decision. Measurement problems are likely to be 
considerable, especially if we try to separate disappointed moral attitudes from 
factual errors, since in such matters empirical and normative beliefs are going 
to be deeply intertwined: Tose who believe that some crimes deserve capital 
punishment (and therefore disappointed by its absence), will also tend to believe 
empirical evidence showing that it deters; those who believe that vaccinations 
cause autism will typically also hold the moral view that vaccination is a personal 
51. Compare Sunstein, supra note 45 at 126 with Sunstein, supra note 5 at 108-10. 
52. An even greater difculty of separating the two arises if we classify (some) deontological 
moral attitudes as cognitive biases. Should these be ignored in technocratic CBA? Cf Dan 
Priel, “Do Societies Prioritize Harm Prevention?” (2019) 37 Revus 127 at 140-44. 






choice that is beyond the legitimate power of the state to mandate.53 Indeed, 
a challenge to a mistaken factual belief (vaccinations are dangerous) may adversely 
afect individual welfare no less than a challenge to a moral belief (vaccinations 
are a matter of personal choice). 
Te current pandemic illustrates this problem of separating factual errors 
from moral beliefs, and further shows how the factual uncertainty discussed in 
the previous section exacerbates it. Te greater is the factual uncertainty, the 
more likely are factual estimates to be driven by—and perhaps also be presented 
as—moral beliefs. Anecdotal evidence suggests that those who believe that the 
risk of the virus is small tend also to think that masks do not prevent the spread 
of the virus (even though the two beliefs are completely independent of each 
other), and also hold the moral view that the state cannot force individuals to 
wear masks.54 Even if we dismiss their factual views as erroneous, they may come 
back into the calculation in the form of their moral beliefs. 
To conclude, politics may enter CBA in at least three places: when deciding 
a questions like how to measure the value of life; when disappointed political 
beliefs are taken into account in determining the costs of a regulation; and when 
in circumstances of factual uncertainty political attitudes fll the gaps. Given the 
levels of uncertainty surrounding COVID-19, especially when the decisions on 
lockdown and shutdown were taken, the prospects of a reliable CBA are dim. 
53. Cf Jeremy D Fraiberg & Michael J Trebilcock, “Risk Regulation: Technocratic and 
Democratic Tools for Regulatory Reform” (1998) 43 McGill LJ 835 at 849-57. For 
psychological studies illustrating the point mentioned in the text in experimental settings see 
Charles G Lord, Less Ross & Mark R Lepper, “Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: 
Te Efects of Prior Teories on Subsequently Considered Evidence” (1979) 37 J Personality 
& Soc Psychol 2098 (balanced evidence on the deterrent efect of capital punishment 
was seen by both opponents and proponents as supporting their views and strengthened 
both sides’ convictions); Peter H Ditto & David F Lopez, “Motivated Skepticism: Use 
of Diferential Decision Criteria for Preferred and Nonpreferred Conclusions” (1992) 
63 J Personality & Soc Psychol 568. To make things worse, studies suggest that once 
beliefs are formed, they tend to resist disconfrming information. See Lee Ross, Mark 
R Lepper & Michael Hubbard, “Perseverance in Self-Perception and Social Perception: 
Biased Attributional Processes in the Debriefng Paradigm” (1975) 32 J Personality & 
Soc Psychol 880. 
54. Cf Gaëlle Marinthe et al, “Looking Out for Myself: Exploring the Relationship Between 
Conspiracy Mentality, Perceived Personal Risk, and COVID-19 Prevention Measures” 
(2020) 25 Brit J Health Psychol 957. Tis kind of motivated reasoning is found in other 
contexts. See Melissa Finucane et al, “Te Afect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and 
Benefts” (2000) 13 J Behav Decision Making 1 (fnding a negative correlation between 
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III. THREE STRATEGIES AND THE INESCAPABILITY OF 
POLITICS 
With scientifc modelling proving inconclusive, diferent countries settled on 
diferent approaches. In a sufciently fne-grained comparison, each country 
has tackled the problems arising from the pandemic somewhat diferently; but 
zooming out from the details, we can identify several distinct approaches. One 
approach focused on signifcant lockdown of the entire population and the 
shutting down of many businesses as means for reducing the opportunities for 
infection and thus the spread of the virus. A second approach has attempted to 
continue with life as we know it on the assumption that in the long run this 
approach will achieve similar epidemiological results but at a lower cost. A third 
approach has focused on a very high volume of testing and tracing as a way of 
quickly identifying and isolating those infected.55 
In a loose sense we can think of these three approaches as models, ideal-types 
that the actual approaches taken by diferent countries may resemble more or less 
closely. All three models are broadly welfarist in orientation, and all assume the 
state has a signifcant role to play in protecting individuals from various health 
risks. My aim is not to call winners and losers. At the time of writing, many 
countries are still struggling to contain the spread of the virus, in some cases 
after declaring early victory only to face rising number of infections a few weeks 
later. By contrast, some countries have seen very small number of infections for 
reasons that are still not entirely clear.56 My aim instead is to show how the 
diferent approaches refect awareness of the need to weigh costs against benefts, 
but how difcult it is to adopt a purely expert-led approach, especially when 
uncertainty is high. 
Using very broad strokes, it is not difcult to present them in terms of CBA 
with the impact of diferent decisions on health, economic activity, and privacy 
55. Tese are not the only strategies. Another approach was adopted in New Zealand, which 
efectively shut its borders. On this strategy see Michael G Baker et al, “New Zealand’s 
Elimination Strategy for the covid-19 Pandemic and What Is Required to Make It Work” 
(2020) 133:1512 NZ Med J 10. Tis strategy has so far proven successful in New Zealand, 
but as the authors note, it is one that is easier to implement in an island country. Another 
country I will largely leave out of the following discussion is the United States. Tough in 
some respects it is closest to the frst strategy, it raises additional issues I cannot consider here. 
56. See Hannah Beech, “No One Knows What Tailand Is Doing Right, but So Far, It’s 
Working,” Te New York Times (16 July 2020), online: <nytimes.com/2020/07/16/world/ 
asia/coronavirus-thailand-photos.html> (Tailand, Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos 
all reporting very low rates of infection). 





assessed diferently. But this kind of “impressionistic CBA” can justify just about 
any conclusion. As the discussion above stressed the infuence of politics on 
CBA, I will attempt to put the three strategies within a political framework. One 
of the upshots of this perspective is highlighting the limitations of the familiar 
single-axis spectrum of left (pro-regulation) versus right (anti-regulation) as the 
basis for analyzing the politics of risk regulation, as the diferent approaches 
considered do not easily map onto it. Nor do the diferent models map neatly on 
a spectrum of more or less democratic regimes: versions of the third strategy, for 
instance, have been adopted by both. 
1. Lockdown: Most western democracies have adopted shutdown as their 
primary risk reduction strategy. In Canada, for example, it was around mid 
March that in short order the diferent provinces declared a state of emergency, 
which included orders for schools and many businesses to shut down, and that 
the federal government severely restricted entry into the country.57 In addition, 
in countries that adopted this approach, people were encouraged, and at times 
required, to stay at home, to practice social distancing, and wear personal 
protective equipment when outside. Te stated rationale for this approach has 
been “fattening the curve.” While the phrase suggests just slowing the number 
of cases while leaving the total number of infections similar (the fattened curve 
is also wider), such policies are likely to lead to lower mortality: Spreading the 
number of infections makes it easier for hospitals to manage new cases without 
being overwhelmed; it also gives health practitioners the opportunity to learn 
from experience and improve their treatment protocols so that those infected 
later receive better care. 
Tough the prolonged lockdown comes with heavy costs, including the 
intrusion into certain rights, this approach refects relatively high concern for 
privacy, which in turn refects a more-or-less conscious decision in the countries 
that opted for this approach to forgo potentially better ways of tracking the 
spread of the virus. I therefore call this approach “high security, high privacy.” 
Tis approach is defnitely not libertarian—it mobilizes the power of the state 
to actively promote and enforce health and economic security—but it still 
sought to maintains some limits on government action because of concern for 
individual rights. 
While this approach is respectful of certain rights, it is hard to see them 
functioning as “trumps” over general welfare: Rights do not give individuals the 
power to act (let alone the power to force the state to protect the act) even if the 
57. See Lauren Vogel, “COVID-19: A Timeline of Canada’s First-Wave Response,” CMAJ News
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action undermines welfare or is deemed by a majority to be undesirable. Rather, 
this approach suggests a possible alternative understanding of rights: Rights here 
serve as means for restricting government action that might otherwise pass CBA 
by giving weight to considerations that are difcult to quantify and as such likely 
to be ignored in more quantitative CBA. Conceptualized in this way rights can 
be seen as consistent with CBA, and perhaps even as a way of improving CBA in 
circumstances of great uncertainty. However, it must be admitted that without 
more, this approach can result in a highly imprecise and easily manipulable 
CBA. It is unclear how much weight should rights be given within an otherwise 
quantitative calculation of costs and benefts. 
2. Natural herd immunity: A second approach tried to ride the outbreak in the 
hope of achieving natural herd immunity more quickly. Tis was the approach 
initially adopted in the United Kingdom, which changed course when mortality 
numbers began climbing at alarming rates, and in Sweden, which persisted for a 
longer period, until it too somewhat changed course. Tough ofcially denied, 
this approach countenances a fairly large number of deaths early in the outbreak 
for the sake of maintaining a functioning economy as well as achieving herd 
immunity relatively quickly.58 (Swedish ofcials claimed in April 2020 their 
country would likely reach that goal in a matter of weeks,59 but later evidence 
did not support this claim.60) Tis approach did not call for “business as usual,” 
as it encouraged individuals to change their behaviour. Nevertheless, in Sweden 
schools and businesses never shut down. 
58. See Christina Anderson & Henrik Pryser Libell, “In the Coronavirus Fight in Scandinavia, 
Sweden Stands Apart,” Te New York Times (28 March 2020), online: <nytimes. 
com/2020/03/28/world/europe/sweden-coronavirus.html>; Catherine Edwards, 
“Coronavirus: Will Sweden Ever Have a Total Lockdown?” Te Local se (20 April 2020), 
online: <thelocal.se/20200420/coronavirus-will-sweden-ever-have-a-total-lockdown>. 
59. See Kim Hjelmgaard, “Swedish Ofcial Anders Tegnell Says ‘Herd Immunity’ in 
Sweden Might Be a Few Weeks Away,” USA Today (28 April 2020), online: <usatoday. 
com/story/news/world/2020/04/28/coronavirus-covid-19-sweden-anders-tegnell-herd-
immunity/3031536001> (interview with the chief epidemiologist at Sweden’s Public 
Health Agency). 
60. See Maddy Savage, “Did Sweden’s Coronavirus Strategy Succeed or Fail?,” BBC News
(24 July 2020), online: <bbc.com/news/world-europe-53498133>; Anne Grietje 
Franssen, “What Does Sweden’s Lower-than-Expected Immunity Mean for the Future 
of Its Strategy,” Te Local se (20 November 2020), online: <thelocal.se/20201120/ 
what-does-swedens-lower-than-expected-immunity-mean-for-the-future-of-its-strategy>. 









Many are now looking at Sweden as an example of a misguided, even callous, 
approach.61 Tey point out that Sweden sufered far higher fatality rates than 
neighbouring Scandinavian countries that adopted strict lockdown policies, 
while still going through a fairly similar economic downturn. At the same time, 
Sweden has not been the worst-performing country in Europe. Its economy has 
indeed slowed down, although not as badly some European countries. (Tis in 
itself is not surprising if shutdown policies in other countries lead to a global 
slump in demand, which is likely to afect an export-led economy like Sweden’s.) 
While some Swedish ofcials and economists still insist that the diferent policies 
should be evaluated at the end of the crisis, others have more recently begun 
questioning the wisdom of this approach.62 
I am not in a position to address the epidemiological question, but it is 
worth remembering that even if it turns out to have been wrong in the end, that 
we should not evaluate it with the wisdom of hindsight. From the perspective of 
the early months of the pandemic, this approach might be explained as follows: 
Given the time it would take to develop a vaccine for the virus, it is unsustainable 
to maintain a shutdown that will last over a year. If that is the case, then the 
question is not whether the negative outcomes will happen, only when. In that 
case, getting the pandemic over with relatively early while building some kind 
of herd immunity through infection while keeping the economy open may look 
like a rational response. It is, however, a risky response, both in tolerating high 
mortality rates early on, as well as in adopting a strategy so out of step with 
almost all other countries. For a risk-averse politician there is safety in numbers 
in being able to point to a policy adopted throughout the world. 
Tus, politically this approach is interesting not because it refects a 
fundamentally diferent ideology from the frst approach. (Tere is a certain irony 
in how “socialist” Sweden became almost overnight the darling of libertarians the 
world over.) No less than the frst approach, the Swedish approach is grounded in 
a welfairst attitude that recognizes the role of state in maintaining public health, 
and with that role the inevitability of weighing costs against benefts. Instead, 
this approach highlights a diferent political factor, the willingness of the Swedish 
61. See Paulina Neuding & Tino Sanandaji, “Is Sweden’s Lax Approach to the Coronavirus 
Backfring?,” Te Washington Post (8 April 2020), online: <washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/2020/04/08/is-swedens-lax-approach-coronavirus-backfring>; cf Timms, supra
note 13 at 40 (without mentioning Sweden, criticizing a herd immunity strategy as 
“eliminationist”). 
62. See Savage, supra note 60; Charlie Duxbury, “Sweden Split on Coronavirus 
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public to trust public health experts to take a leading role in policy making, even 
when it came to questions on which science could not provide clear answers. 
(Seen this way, Sweden no longer sounds like the libertarian’s utopia.) Swedish 
society has long exhibited “collectivity, homogeneity, and consensualism,” which 
together with its high levels of trust in government, explain this deferential 
attitude when faced with scientifc uncertainty.63 Tis is one way of dealing with 
major gaps in the data needed for CBA, but it is an approach that is hard to 
export to places whose political culture is diferent. 
3. Closer surveillance: Several countries adopted lockdown policies to which 
they added various tracking and surveillance mechanisms as a way of controlling 
the spread of the virus. To give a favour of these approaches, “[i]n Singapore, the 
details of where patients live, work and play are released quickly online, allowing 
others to protect themselves.”64 Similar practices were adopted in South Korea, 
where in addition, a new law “allows South Korean health ofcials to access a 
wide range of personal data, including cellphone location information and credit 
card transactions, without a court order.”65 
In many ways this model is similar to the frst one, but it difers from it 
in being a “high security, low privacy” model. So far, this model seems to have 
been successful, and countries that adopted it (which along with South Korea 
include China and Taiwan) have been able to contain the spread of the virus with 
a relatively low infection and fatality rates. Tere are diferent possible reasons 
for this, including the fact that many of the countries adopting this model have 
63. Jon Pierre, “Nudges Against Pandemics: Sweden’s COVID-19 Containment Strategy in 
Perspective” (2020) 39 Pol’y & Soc’y 478 at 480, 488, 489; Richard Milne, “Anders Tegnell 
and the Swedish Experiment,” Te Financial Times (10 September 2020), online: <ft.com/ 
content/5cc92d45-fbdb-43b7-9c66-26501693a371>. 
64. Hannah Beech, “Tracking the Coronavirus: How Crowded Asian Cities Tackled an 
Epidemic,” Te New York Times (17 March 2020), online: <nytimes.com/2020/03/17/ 
world/asia/coronavirus-singapore-hong-kong-taiwan.html>; see also Cheryl Lu-Lien Tan, 
“Inside a Two-Week Quarantine in Singapore,” Te Washington Post (3 April 2020), online: 
<washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/03/inside-two-week-quarantine-singapore>. For 
similar practices in South Korea see Mark Zastrow, “South Korea Is Reporting Intimate 
Details of COVID-19 Cases: Has It Helped?,” Nature (18 March 2020), online: <nature. 
com/articles/d41586-020-00740-y>. 
65. Hyonhee Shin, Hyunjoo Jin & Josh Smith, “How South Korea Turned an Urban Planning 
System into a Virus Tracking Database,” Reuters (22 May 2020), online: <reuters.com/article/ 
us-health-coronavirus-southkorea-tracing/how-south-korea-turned-an-urban-planning-
system-into-a-virus-tracking-database-idUSKBN22Y03I>; see also See Natasha Singer & 
Choe Sang-Hun, “As Coronavirus Surveillance Escalates, Personal Privacy Plummets,” 
Te New York Times (23 March 2020), online: <nytimes.com/2020/03/23/technology/ 
coronavirus-surveillance-tracking-privacy.html>. 











had a relatively recent experience with smaller epidemics, which made both the 
government and the population better prepared to respond quickly to the current 
outbreak.66 However, it seems that part of the diference in approach may also 
have something to do with a diferent political orientation. Specifcally, this 
approach may refect greater willingness of people to give up some of their rights 
for the sake of the common good.67 Indeed, some news reports from countries 
that adopted this strategy described popular eforts to enforce security measures 
that went even beyond government-mandated policies.68 
IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: THE WELFARE STATE 
AND INFORMATION 
It would be too facile to say that the three models described in the previous Part 
are straightforward application of CBA and just refect diferent weights assigned 
to the costs and benefts due to uncertainty. To say this would render CBA 
consistent with virtually any policy. So understood, it will confrm what critics of 
CBA say of it, that for all its aspirations for rationality and apolitical objectivity, 
it is nothing more than a rhetorical device for giving political decisions the patina 
of neutral science. But the three approaches do show how political considerations 
afect the question of tradeofs that CBA attempts to address.69 Tey can help 
guide thinking about risk regulation in cases of lower levels of uncertainty. One 
thing that the current situation highlights is the difculty of incorporating CBA 
into a political process. As shown, one approach seeks to do so by turning political 
66. Eun A Jo, “A Democratic Response to Coronavirus: Lessons from 
South Korea,” Te Diplomat (30 March 2020), online: <thediplomat. 
com/2020/03/a-democratic-response-to-coronavirus-lessons-from-south-korea>. 
67. For examples and discussion of such attitudes from long before the pandemic see Daniel 
A Bell, Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Tinking for an East Asian Context (Princeton 
University Press, 2006) at 73-75. 
68. See Raymond Zhong & Paul Mozur, “To Tame Coronavirus, Mao-Style Social 
Control Blankets China,” Te New York Times (15 February 2020), online: <nytimes. 
com/2020/02/15/business/china-coronavirus-lockdown.html> (reporting on a combination 
of government- and community-led eforts to restrict movement); Jo, supra note 66 (“It is the 
voluntary cooperation of the citizens that allowed the government to eschew more extreme 
measures and maintain a delicate balance between public safety and civil liberties. … South 
Korea’s ‘democratic’ response is … a result of public solidarity.”). 
69. See Max S Kim, “Seoul’s Radical Experiment in Digital Contact Tracing,” Te New Yorker
(17 April 2020), online: <newyorker.com/news/news-desk/seouls-radical-experiment-in-
digital-contact-tracing> (“few countries were getting away with not sacrifcing some kinds of 
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attitudes into elements within the CBA calculus. I hinted (at best) at a diferent 
approach, one that retains the consequentialist core of CBA but recognizes the 
need to incorporate it within a political system. 
I will conclude by briefy mentioning one example, which touches on one 
question that gets frequently asked these days: What will be the long-term 
efects of the pandemic? Tis question can, of course, be the subject of whole 
books. Te one aspect of it I will consider here is the efects the shutdown 
policies will have on the role of the state. Te three models I considered in the 
previous Part ft a broad defnition a “welfare states,” by which I mean states 
that take an active role in managing and reducing a wide range of risks that 
individuals face. Tis defnition does not cover everything that states do, but it 
is not idiosyncratic either. It is based on the idea that a major role of the state 
is provide, or manage the provision of, security. In this sense there is continuity 
between the nineteenth-century night-watchman state as a provider of security 
against certain risks and the twentieth-century welfare state that provides security 
against a wider range of risks.70 
Despite this continuity, it is also true that in the course of the twentieth 
century states “grew” in size compared to their nineteenth-century counterparts. 
One factor in this expansion in the role of the state came with the advent of new 
technologies, which made security against more risks possible. By “technologies,” 
I mean human inventions, both physical (computing machines, tracking devices) 
and intellectual (statistics, probability), that made it possible to collect and analyze 
vast amounts of information. Much of what welfare states do requires, if it is to be 
done well, the deployment of these technologies. Te great responsibilities that 
came with the assumption of great powers have created the information-hogging 
beast that is the welfare state. Tis beast—Hobbes called the state “Leviathan” 
for a reason—is both a (the) major provider of security and a (the) major source 
70. Cf Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Teory of Liberal Democracy (University 
of Chicago Press, 1995) at ch 8 (arguing for continuity between classical liberalism and 
welfare). More specifcally Holmes also shows that the association of freedom with security 
is not novel (see ibid at 245). See also Emma Rothschild, “What Is Security?” (1995) 124:3 
Dædalus 53 at 61-63. What may have changed is the greater tendency to speak of this kind 
of government action as an enhancement of freedom rather than as an intrusion into it. See 
Lord Macmillan, Law & Other Tings (Cambridge University Press, 1937) at 8-9 (“I am not 
less but more the captain of my soul in a city which is well sewered, well paved, well policed, 
and free from slums and the diseases they breed, in which the education, the health and 
welfare of my fellow-citizens are promoted by sensible measures”); James M Landis, “Law 
and the New Liberties” (1939) 4 Mo L Rev 105 at 108; cf ER Hopkins, “Administrative 
Justice in Canada” (1939) 19 Can Bar Rev 619 at 626-27. 




of potential insecurity. Te primary motivation for limiting government power is 
also a reason to want to strengthen it. 
Tis is the paradox at the heart of the liberal welfare state: to be efective, 
it requires a lot of information about—and thus inevitably potential control 
over—individuals, all for the sake of maintaining security, which is in turn 
justifed for promoting human independence. Tis is not an easy position to hold: 
Superfcially, in their opposite ways, libertarians and authoritarians seem more 
consistent. Te COVID-19 pandemic puts considerable strain on the welfare 
state, not just in the obvious sense of the enormous expenditures governments are 
currently incurring while simultaneously facing a signifcant shortfall in revenue. 
Te pandemic also strains the welfare state in a deeper sense, in expanding state 
power, which inevitably brings with it greater risks to individual security, for the 
sake of greater security. 
As shown above, some of the most successful countries in controlling the 
spread of COVID-19 have done so by adopting privacy-invasive policies. Various 
plans proposed for a return to normalcy in countries that followed the frst model 
have almost invariably relied on implementing technological tools that in efect 
move them toward this model.71 To anyone who accepts the logic of CBA, this 
approach could be justifed as an acceptable response to an emergency: Te use 
of intrusive technology has signifcant costs, which while not justifed in normal 
times, could pass CBA muster during a pandemic. An emergency is a time of a 
heightened risk of a signifcant loss, the prevention of which justifes incurring 
greater costs. But history has shown that times of emergency (real or perceived) 
are rarely times of rational response; it has also shown that once granted, 
71. See Ezra Klein, “I’ve Read the Plans to Reopen the Economy. Tey’re Scary,” Vox (10 
April 2020), online: <vox.com/2020/4/10/21215494/coronavirus-plans-social-distancing-
economy-recession-depression-unemployment>; Gideon Lichfeld, “We’re Not Going 
Back to Normal,” MIT Technology Review (17 March 2020), online: <technologyreview. 
com/2020/03/17/905264/coronavirus-pandemic-social-distancing-18-months>; Norimitsu 
Onishi & Constant Méheut, “France Weighs Its Love of Liberty in Fight Against 
Coronavirus,” Te New York Times (17 April 2020), online: <nytimes.com/2020/04/17/ 
world/europe/coronavirus-france-digital-tracking.html>; Natasha Singer & Choe Sang-Hun, 
“As Coronavirus Surveillance Escalates, Personal Privacy Plummets,” Te New York Times 
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“temporary” powers are often difcult to roll back.72 Would emergency measures 
adopted today become the new normal?73 
Tis is an example of the way even those, like me, who are sympathetic to 
CBA must acknowledge that it is not a technocratic means of avoiding politics. 
Serious thinking about the way CBA is incorporated into politics will have to go 
beyond measuring the costs of those whose favoured moral or political views are 
disappointed. Tese issues and tensions existed, of course, before the pandemic. 
A year ago, a lot of public debate revolved around maintaining privacy in an age 
of ubiquitous digital technology. Tese debates are much subdued now, but one 
day we will go back to them. When that happens, the way they are reshaped by 
the pandemic may prove to be one of its most lasting efects. 
72. Cf John Dryzek & Robert E Goodin, “Risk-Sharing and Social Justice: Te Motivational 
Foundations of the Post-War Welfare State” (1986) 16 Brit J Pol Sci 1 at 11-21 (showing 
how an expansion in government expenditure during World War II was not entirely rolled 
back after the war). 
73. Cf Zhong, supra note 32 (“ofcials in some places [in China] are loading their 
[virus-tracking] apps with new features, hoping the software will live on as more than just an 
emergency measure”). 

